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Abstract—The education sector is considered to have the 
poorest security culture score amongst many sectors. Human 
aspects of cyber security including cyber security culture 
which have often been overlooked in the study of cyber 
security have not been fully explored in Higher Education 
Institutions (HEIs). The lack of understanding of cyber 
security culture, unclear definition of the concept and guidance 
on how to measure and foster it, are challenges HEIs face. To 
address this lack of knowledge and understanding, we explore 
the factors that influence people's view of cyber security 
culture in UK HEIs. We interviewed senior HEI leaders, 
academics, professional services staff, and students (19 
participants in total) in three UK universities of similar 
characteristics. We find that communication necessary to 
influence security culture in HEIs is lacking. There is lack of 
policies/frameworks in place to guide user behaviour. We also 
observe that IT expectations are not well defined, and phishing 
exercises create problems between the IT team and users. 
There is no onboarding security training and awareness for 
students which make up the largest percentage of the HEI 
populace. We recommend that senior HEI leaders invest in 
training and awareness programmes for IT staff and other 
users, focusing on communication, engagement, collaboration, 
and social engineering. We also recommend that senior HEI 
leaders prioritise the creation and implementation of a cyber 
security strategy, on which policies and other security efforts 
could be based. The adoption of these recommendations could 
influence the mindsets of users towards engaging in safe cyber 
security behaviours and by doing so improving the culture of 
security in HEIs. 
 
Keywords- Cyber security culture; Higher Education 
Institutions (HEIs); security behaviour; communication; 
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
The increasing use of technology in the twenty-first 
century continues to yield huge benefits to nations, 
organisations, and individuals in their day-to-day activities. 
Modern technological advancements such as Artificial 
Intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), big data, 5G, 
cloud computing and blockchain have affected different 
areas of society [1][2]. The application of these technologies 
has brought improvements to different industry sectors, 
ranging from medical to education. However, the reliance 
on technology also has its challenges. The application of the 
technological advancements in different domains translate 
into more data being generated. With the increase in the 
attack surface (that is, the total of all exposures of an 
information system) [3] due to the abundance of data 
generated, organisations become easy targets for cyber 
attacks.  
Huge volume of data has caused organisations and users 
to be prime targets for cyber attacks and hackers [4]. Cyber 
attacks use innovative approaches. Cyber attacks and 
hackers use different methods, and in some instances, they 
use advanced technology to prevent staff and students from 
gaining access to the needed data and networks. This is a 
major threat in HEIs, where the availability to information 
could be denied by cyber attacks [5]. According to [5], most 
UK HEIs are not well prepared to defend their human and 
information assets from breaches, phishing attacks, and 
other security vulnerabilities.  
    Users continue to pose a threat to the information assets 
of HEIs. As the PwC Information Security Breaches Survey 
[6] reports, three quarters of large organisations suffered 
staff-related security breaches while for small businesses it 
was one third, a respective percentage rise of 17% and 9% 
from 2014 to 2015. When organisations were questioned 
about the single worst breach suffered, 50% attributed the 
cause to inadvertent human error. This was a percentage 
increase of 19% from 2014 to 2015.  
    Human error can be attributed to accidents or negligence. 
The importance of paying attention to human error is further 
corroborated by the IBM survey which states that nine out 
of ten information security incidents are caused by some 
sort of human error [7]. 
    Thus, it is reasonable to hypothesise that human factors 
constitute a challenge for HEI leaders too. The approach 
many organisation leaders have taken to reduce the risk 
posed by cyber threats is focusing on and increasing their 
investments on technical controls [8]. Traditionally, the 
focus of risk mitigation in information security has been on 
technical solutions. Despite following this approach to 
defend the organisation ecosystem, cyber security breaches 
have not declined [9]. While technical solutions offer some 
protection, it is not a panacea for all cyber security breaches. 
Hence, this calls for additional defence to be employed [10].   
    Over the years the approach to information security has 
evolved and gone through many stages. As study [11] 
shows, the information security evolution moved from the 
initial stages where information security was characterised 
solely by technical approach, best left for technical experts 
[12] to a stage where efforts were made to understand and 
address the human element as an essential security factor 
[13]. 
    The industry is now at a stage where researchers and 
organisations are becoming more aware of the importance 
of the often-overlooked area, that is, the human aspect of 
cyber security with emphasis on Cyber Security Culture 
(CSC). This stage is characterised by researchers defining 
CSC, identifying, and attempting to address the gaps that 
exist in the domain [14]. Although there are studies that 
indicate associations between CSC and characteristics such 
as attitudes and social norms, there are only indirect 
associations between CSC and secure behaviour [15].   
    While some organisations have different training and 
awareness programmes in place, a study of CSC definitions 
[16] shows the ineffectiveness of security awareness and 
education demonstrating that training itself is not enough. 
Therefore, more research is required to gain a deeper 
understanding of the human aspect of cyber security.  
    An understanding of CSC will provide an insight which 
could be used to address users’ unsafe security behaviours. 
There are gaps that have been identified based on extant 
literature on CSC, which argue that the field lacks guidance 
on how to foster it. For instance, the descriptive and 
theoretical solutions offered by researchers can be 
impractical to apply in organisational settings, tool 
validation is needed, and guidelines and practices are 
needed for developing and implementing security culture in 
organisations. Also, a gap exists between awareness levels, 
respective practices, and behaviour [16]. Security culture 
improvement is needed in organisations to maintain a 
healthy posture.  
    Importantly, there are limited empirical studies on CSC in 
HEIs. Cyber security culture is ill-defined and there are no 
clear guidelines on how to foster security culture. The 
education sector lacks understanding about this important 
domain. The consequence of this is that users exhibit certain 
security behaviours which make their institution a prime 
target for cyber attacks. If we know personnel and students’ 
perception of CSC, then we will better understand why they 
exhibit such security behaviours which put their institutions 
at risk of cyber breaches. 
    In this paper, we focus on CSC in the education sector. 
Our aim is to explore what influences personnel (senior 
management members, academics, professional services/ 
administrative staff) and students’ views of CSC in HEIs. It 
is when we understand what is happening in this domain 
and in this environment, that effective strategies, methods, 
and appropriate course of action could be proposed and 
taken to defend information assets in the institutions. Then, 
plans could be made to instil security behaviours in people 
which will lead to a healthy security posture in HEIs.  
II. BACKGROUND AND IMPORTANCE  
The sector is an attractive target for ransomware attacks 
enabled by phishing operations. Many HEIs around the 
world and in the UK suffer from cyber attacks on a regular 
basis. A Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC) report 
[17] indicates that UK HEIs are not well prepared to defend 
themselves and recover from cyber attacks, if and when they 
happen. In a survey of CSC in 17 industry sectors, 
distributed across 24 countries, the Security Culture Report 
[18] confirms that the education sector has the poorest 
security culture score among other poor performers such as 
transportation and energy and utilities.  
    The education sector continues to be an increasingly 
attractive target for cyber attacks because of the wealth of 
information repositories it holds. Information ranges from 
intellectual property to information about staff, students, and 
alumni. Cyber attacks in UK HEIs are increasing and are 
becoming more targeted at users in this sector because of its   
poor security culture. Indicatively, breaches have been 
reported at University of Greenwich [19], and University of 
Edinburgh [20]. This could lead to financial and indirect 
losses, such as reputational damage, cost of containing the 
breach, etc. The security solutions that have often been 
proposed and offered by organisations and security 
professionals have little or no involvement with users. With 
a new perspective, we make some recommendations.  
    We identified three UK universities with similar 
characteristics to conduct interviews.  
 
III. CURRENT STATE OF CYBER SECURITY CULTURE 
CSC studies have been conducted in different sectors, 
such as banking and finance, healthcare, and government 
organisations. CSC related work has focussed on the 
definitions of information security culture (ISC) and CSC, 
with the two considered to be similar. Although, there are 
similarities between ISC and CSC, there is no universally 
agreed definition of CSC [16]. 
    Researchers have also developed models and frameworks 
to provide guidance in the understanding of CSC. Some of 
these have built on Schein’s iceberg model of organisation 
culture [21]. The STOPE framework [22] have been used as 
a basis to develop another framework such as the 
Information Security Culture Framework (ISCF) in [23].  
Other areas that are important for building and maintaining 
CSC are management support or involvement, security 
awareness and training, security policy, communication and 
change management [24]-[30]. 
    Some of the existing solutions that have been offered are 
theoretical and conceptual in nature, mainly geared towards 
industry and not HEI-focussed. The solutions are not 
adequate for fostering CSC in industry nor in HEIs. Hence, 
there is the need for some of the solutions to be tested 
through empirical studies. To the best of our knowledge, 
there is a lack of empirical studies focusing on the cyber 
security posture of UK HEIs. In view of the inadequate 
solutions, we investigate the perceptions of personnel and 
students of CSC in UK HEIs.  
Our goal is to highlight the current problems in UK HEIs 
through a practical approach, allowing pertinent issues of 
security culture to emerge. Findings could then be used by 
researchers as a basis for further CSC investigations in UK 
HEIs and beyond. 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY  
We approached staff in three HEIs, all located in the 
south of England, that were considered similar in terms of 
student numbers (between 10,000 and 20,000) and staff 
numbers. The websites of the three UK universities were 
used to contact participants (N=19) that fit the criteria of our 
target group, resulting in interviews with three senior 
management members, six academics (three of whom have 
information security background), seven professional 
services/administrative staff, and three PhD students.  
    Interviews started with general questions on the role and 
responsibilities of the interviewee [31][32]. Questions 
included security perceptions, governance, devolution, 
university structure and culture. Other questions focused on 
training and development, security of information and 
records.  
    To understand what influences personnel and students’ 
views of CSC, we conducted semi-structured interviews, 
with questions designed and conducted by a 
multidisciplinary team of three researchers.  
   One-to-one interviews were conducted between 29 
January 2020 and 21 July 2020. Sixteen interviews were 
conducted face-to-face while three were done online. The 
interview duration was approximately 30 minutes. 
Participant’s personal identifiable information was 
anonymised during data cleaning by one of the researchers 
and were therefore unidentifiable for the other researchers.  
    Interviews were recorded, transcribed, and then analysed. 
Content analysis of the interviews, based on the approach 
described in [32]-[34], was conducted with support of 
NVivo software. In total 1961 statements were identified.  
    We focus on the individual level of the security culture 
model presented in [11]. The individual level of the model 
focuses on user attributes and characteristics which impact 
security attitude and behaviour. We make the model more 
comprehensive by adapting it to cover more factors related 
to the user’s internal-driven individual notions which affect 
their security attitude and behaviour. Other relevant 
dimensions are identified from [18] and the comprehensive 
model is presented in Figure 1. The individual level is 
further broken down into the seven dimensions of CSC. The 
definitions of the dimensions are as shown in TABLE 1. 
DIMENSIONS OF CYBER SECURITY CULTURE. From the 
detailed analysis of our interviews, themes, that is, recurring 
topics emerge.  
 
Figure 1. A Comprehensive Security Culture Model [11] 
 
TABLE 1. DIMENSIONS OF CYBER SECURITY CULTURE [18] 
V.  RESULTS  
From the analysis of the 1961 interview statements 
identified within the 19 interviews, Condensed Meaning 
Units (CMUs) were generated. A CMU is the shortened 
version of an interview statement that retains the primary 
meaning. The relevant CMUs related to CSC dimensions 
(TABLE 1. DIMENSIONS OF CYBER SECURITY CULTURE) 
were grouped into codes and were labelled in relation to 
their content or context; thus, allowing the formation of 
categories. From the categories, six themes, which reveal 
underlying meanings, emerge. The themes are: 
communication; policies and frameworks; IT expectations; 
moving away from phishing exercises; training, reinforced 
training and awareness; and CSC measurement. 
    In this section, we present our findings and the emerging 
themes from the qualitative analysis; indicative interview 
excerpts are provided for each finding. 
 
 
Dimension  Definition 
Attitude The feelings and beliefs that employees have 
toward the security protocol 
Behaviours The actions and activities of employees that have 




Employees’ understanding, knowledge, and 
awareness of security issues and activities 
Communication The quality of communication channels to discuss 
security-related topics, promote a sense of 
belonging and provide support for security issues 
and incident reporting 
Compliance The knowledge of written security policies and the 
extent that employees follow them 
Norms The knowledge of and adherence to unwritten rules 
of conduct in the organisation 
Responsibilities How employees perceive their role as a critical 
factor in sustaining or endangering the security of 
the organisation 
 
A. Communication  
Communication is the main emerging theme in this study 
that underpins all other themes. Communication is a vital 
tool which must be mastered and used effectively in 
collaboration, relationship building, policy conveying, 
awareness raising and training. The key categories from the 
study which contribute to the emergence of this theme are 
communication improvement, beneficial outcomes of 
collaboration, communication, and information 
management. The latter captures poor and impersonal 
communication with users and consists of unclear university 
cyber security plans, which are poorly communicated with 
users.  
1) Communication Finding 1: Lack of systematic 
communication from the IT team to users 
Communication problems exist in HEIs. As an interviewee 
explains “there is a lack of systematic communication 
between the IT services regarding cyber security to staff in 
general”. IT communication is seen as unclear and opaque, 
and because of this, users have had to form their own 
judgements based on the little or no information they have 
about security. The following indicative extracts support 
this: “I don't even know that. So, I would just like them to 
be a bit more clear”; “So I feel there's a real [problem], 
everything is very opaque”. While another interviewee 
understands that the IT team could be busy because of other 
priorities, they state “They have priorities and that security, 
because I don't hear about any of this stuff. I don't know. So, 
I formed judgements because I don't have information”. 
    The following extracts demonstrate the lack of 
communication from the IT team to users: “I don't think 
there is enough communication. That's my big thing, just 
not communicating enough”. An interviewee explains the 
need for the IT team to listen more “I think that generally 
our IT department do a very good job of communicating, 
but we don't always do a very good job of listening”. 
    Further, as another user indicates there is a lack of 
transparency from the IT team: “[IT] haven't told us 
anything about it. They don't tend to tell us stuff about that. 
So yeah, maybe they could communicate with us better 
about what they are doing”. Hence, users demand for more 
communication. An interviewee suggests that 
communication from the IT team needs to be refined “And 
clearly they are monitoring phishing emails, and they are 
sending reminders to people. So ‘don't click things’ and so 
on. Let's forget if that is a correct reminder because you 
can't actually tell people not to click the link [..]. It's part of 
the job”. Thus, there is a query on how people can even do 
their work if such information is being promulgated without 
an alternative solution being offered. 
    Participants highlighted the specific need for pre- and 
post-phishing communication where phishing exercises 
have been planned. An interviewee sums this up: “I feel like 
there should be a message to say like, [..], this was a 
phishing test” and on post phishing exercises 
communication “but then definitely there needs to be a clear 
explanation afterwards as to why they did that and then how 
students should react and what would be beneficial for them 
to do in that situation”.  
2) Communication Finding 2: Collaboration problems 
exist between the IT team and academics 
An observation made is that there are collaboration 
problems, where academics’ offer of their cyber security 
expertise and this is not embraced by the IT team, as the 
following extracts indicate: "I try to work with them and to 
offer help and to try to increase the level of communication 
and collaboration, that has proved to be difficult". This 
signifies a challenge in information sharing between 
academics and IT staff. 
3) Communication Finding 3: Communication is 
impersonal 
Another finding from our study indicates that 
communication is impersonal. There are no names on emails 
received from IT services. An interviewee says, “I don't like 
the fact that [..] you don't ever get a signature, you have a 
conversation with someone over a few emails and you don't 
know who you're talking to”.  
B. Policies and Frameworks for Guiding Cyber Security 
Behaviour   
This theme is concerned with the need to have policies 
and frameworks in place to guide the cyber security 
expectations and behaviours of HEI information asset users. 
The policies cover behaviour sets that influence how people 
practice cyber security. The behaviour sets are compliance 
with security policy, intergroup coordination and 
communication, phishing email behaviour, and password 
behaviour [35]. The policies act as guide for users 
(including IT staff) in their daily use of information assets 
and interactions with other users and technology. It also 
covers regulatory, legal, and compliance information, 
including General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).  
    Our aim is to assess personnel and students’ perception of 
the policies and frameworks that are in place and their 
impact on influencing user behaviour towards security 
compliance. 
1) Policies and Frameworks Finding 1: Lack of enough 
policies/frameworks 
Our findings show that enough policies and frameworks are 
not in place for guiding user behaviour in HEIs. With 
reference to policies and processes that are specific to cyber 
security an interviewee states “I don't think there are 
enough, policies and processes in place that people would 
want to work around it". An interviewee does not feel the 
HEI security policy defines the boundaries through which 
they operate, “there is nothing to stop me sending a personal 
email from my work account, so we don't have anything, I 
believe, in our terms or policies that prevent you from doing 
that". Further, another interviewee says, "there is too much 
writing of policies and not enough doing it", suggesting a 
lack of policy implementation.  
    The policies that are in place are not communicated 
effectively to students and staff. Policy information is 
shared via employment contract suggesting a passive 
approach of communication. An interviewee comments "..a 
lot of it is covered by individual employment contracts with 
us, or student enrolment with us in those different areas, as 
to the standards that [we are] required to meet and what they 
can and can't do with our network and our information 
assets". 
2) Policies and Frameworks Finding 2: Lack of 
prioritisation  
Prioritisation is another problem identified through this 
research. For instance, an interviewee comments: "I think 
one of the challenges [the university] has had around cyber 
security is that it has tried to do everything in terms of 
policy standard and technology all at once without any real 
sense of priority and without any real sense of priority based 
on an intelligent assessment of what the actual threat and 
risk is". While another interviewee states "Is it in a 
framework, is it written down? Can I put my hand on it and 
say, in priority order, these are the most critical data sets and 
services to the running of this organisation, you know, 
prioritise these for security and resilience over others? No. I 
don't think there is" 
C. IT Expectations    
This theme is about the need for the IT team to engage 
more with users to understand the challenges that they face 
in terms of not knowing what is expected of them. The 
scope of the theme relates to compliance and non-
compliance with IT expectations. Its purpose is to explore 
users’ attitude and behaviour towards compliance with IT 
expectations.    
1) IT Expectations Finding 1: IT Expectations are not 
well defined 
IT expectations are not defined clearly. An interviewee says, 
“that sounds a little bit weak because the expectations are 
probably not very well defined, as I probably mentioned 
there is a lack of systematic communication between the IT 
services regarding cyber security to staff in general". This 
finding also demonstrates that there is a link between IT 
expectations and communication.  
2) IT Expectations Finding 2: Academics do not see the 
need for IT compliance 
An interviewee comments about the attitude of academics 
towards compliance, “I think academic ones, they often 
don't see why they should and don't understand the 
implication of what they're doing. And you get that in other 
things like financial regulations and HR regulations as well. 
They just think that it's getting in their way. They've got 
things to do and it's the silliness, and they don't understand 
really the serious implications of what they're doing”. And a 
comparison is made between academics and professional 
services staff with interviewees commenting that: "Some of 
us are very into it and others just don't understand and it [is] 
just blocking their job, which it isn't, but they think it is"; “I 
think you'll have a higher compliance rate with us than you 
would with other teams around or other roles around 
campus”. This demonstrates that there is compliance 
disparity between user groups across the HEI. 
3) IT Expectations Finding 3: Users want to comply 
Users want to comply with IT expectations because “it's 
within the framework of the organisation”. A senior 
academic state their willingness to comply "Well, [..] we're 
in the business of [..] we're information security academics. 
So, I guess our day job is about- I mean in some sense, one 
part of our mission is to keep the world secure, to educate 
people about security practice". An interviewee comments, 
“so you know, [..] there's no clear guidance on how to 
behave with stuff like this and what to do if there's a 
problem." 
    Although, users are willing to comply with IT 
expectations, but there are some instances when they may 
not comply, as the following interviewee extract indicates: 
"I think we are very likely to comply, because I don't think 
they are too difficult to comply with. So again, I think 
there's this trade off, if they expect a lot from us, it will be 
more difficult to comply with, right? So not asking a lot, but 
asking something that is reasonable, is, [..] again makes it 
easier for us to comply". Further, interviewees say they will 
not comply under certain conditions: “if this is a restriction 
on my research"; things start to sound unreasonable and 
they start to become, an obstacle to our work, then the 
temptation not to comply increases"; "I think we’d only 
think it's excessive if it was actually hindering us being able 
to interact". 
D. Moving Away from Phishing Exercises   
The theme focuses on the observation that was made 
about how unproductive phishing exercises are and about 
the need to move away from it. The theme establishes the 
context for phishing exercises, if at all they are to be done. 
In which case it needs to be planned, people need to be 
informed and carried along, this has not been the case in 
HEIs. 
1) Moving Away from Phishing Exercises Finding 1: 
Phishing exercises create more problems between the IT 
Team and users 
Phishing exercises create problems of distrust and 
resentment between IT team and users. An interviewee says,  
"these kind of so-called realistic phishing exercise [..] will 
probably cause more problems than solving problems 
because it will cause some confusion, that can potentially 
even make the functionality fail". Another interviewee 
comments, “I’d find it a little bit, I guess in a way I’d feel 
it’s a little bit violating that your own university is trying to 
phish you, even if it's to teach you a lesson, you know, it 
feels a bit off-putting”. Phishing of staff creates anger as 
these interviewee extracts indicate: "I know some 
colleagues who were very angry about it, particularly, they 
thought, they were insulted that they were being phished by 
the, especially the information security staff"…"but equally 
I think it annoys people as well". 
2) Moving Away from Phishing Exercises Finding 2: 
Phishing exercises results used to blame others 
There is the tendency that phishing exercises results could 
be used by the university to blame people [36]. This is the 
undertone of this extract "[..] for those that got caught, it 
would have been a bit of a wakeup call, I suspect, and it 
wasn't, and are probably feeling a bit stupid and being a bit 
cross about it, but actually if they think about it for 30 
seconds, they should be quite glad that they clicked on 
something that was quite innocent and it was helping them 
raise awareness". Similarly, an interviewee raises a concern 
about “the risks with these phishing techniques are that, they 
might be just used to blame users and that’s, not ideal”. In 
view of aforementioned arguments, some users feel it causes 
panic and advise that “it is not the way forward”. 
3) Moving Away from Phishing Exercises Finding 3: 
Phishing exercises opposed 
Phishing exercises are opposed to. For instance, one 
interview states that there is "a lot of bad feeling from staff 
who felt that this is not a particular way to go". Due to the 
negative feelings from users, they have shown resistance to 
the implementation of phishing exercises. 
E. Training, Reinforced Training and Awareness    
Training is needed in universities by users and cyber 
security staff alike. This theme majors on user behavioural 
change through training and awareness, with a knock-on 
effect on security culture. The focus of the theme is on all 
users (including IT staff and students) and how to better 
equip them to secure information assets. It is through 
training and awareness that mindsets that influence unsafe 
user behaviour could be changed.  
1) Training, Reinforced Training and Awareness 
Finding 1: Cyber security training is lacking 
Our finding shows that cyber security training is lacking as 
an interviewee admits, “No. There's no such thing as far as I 
understand. There’s no cyber security training for staff or 
students as far as I'm aware”. Further, another interviewee 
states that there is “No cyber security training for staff or 
students”. Interviewees recognised that it may be about 
signposting for the training: “But I've not been on anything 
[portal] that says, “this is cyber security, and you shall do 
it”; “there isn't any, what I would describe as dedicated on-
boarding training around students for cyber security and 
institution”. The lack of cyber security training could create 
vulnerabilities and awareness problems that cyber attacks 
may exploit. 
F. Cyber Security Culture Measurement    
Cyber security culture is hard to define, grasp and 
measure [16]. In view of this, it is the observable aspects of 
CSC that should be measured. These aspects of CSC are 
training over time, training uptake, incident reporting, cyber 
security climate, etc. This is an upcoming area of research 
that is currently being explored. The theme revolves around 
how to measure the observable aspects of CSC and its 
implementation across HEIs. 
1) Culture Measurement Finding 1: Lack of knowledge 
about culture measurement 
Interviewees feel that security culture is not measured in the 
HEIs, that it is difficult to measure, and that there is lack of 
understanding on how to measure it. For instance, 
interviewees commented that: "I don't think we measure 
culture, and I don't think most people know how to measure 
the culture"; "it's quite difficult to measure the culture". 
VI. DICUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Communication 
The lack of systematic communication on cyber security 
between the IT team and users could be due to the absence 
of the needed training and communication skills among IT 
staff. 
    In some HEIs, restructuring of the cyber security and IT 
teams have led to under-resourced teams with reduced 
manpower. Hence, IT teams must prioritise and concentrate 
on technical solutions and approaches, the “traditional 
means” for defending universities’ information assets. 
Focusing on technical solutions over the human aspect of 
cyber security could have resulted in the lack of interest in 
systematic communication with users. The restructuring 
within universities could also have been influenced by 
limited financial budget and insufficient cyber security 
investment, a challenge many Western HEIs face [37]. The 
same resource issue is a problem Malaysian HEIs 
experience, which delay the adaptation and implementation 
of security policies [38]. 
    A reason for unclear communication could be the lack of 
understanding of what is to be communicated. For example, 
policies, training content, safe security behaviours or best 
practices. The communication problem is corroborated by 
the JISC survey on digital experience insight in UK HEIs 
[39]. The survey reports that 39% of students state that they 
were not informed by their institution how their personal 
data was stored or used. Also, it could be challenging for IT 
staff to translate technical information into simple layman’s 
language for non-technical users to understand. Conversely, 
translating information on human aspects of security into 
technical solutions by IT staff is not an easy task as ENISA 
reports [40]. 
    The collaboration problem between the IT team and 
academics could be caused by the lack of engagement in 
times past, which leaves no room for ideas to be shared and 
received. The IT team may also see the offer from 
academics as a way of monitoring their work. The culture of 
‘us versus them’ could also have influenced the IT teams 
not embracing the offer of help from academics. 
    Some of the different perspectives provided by academics 
with information security background is that of their 
willingness to offer their expertise to assist the IT team and 
improve the cyber security posture in the HEI. Some feel 
that it is through the sharing of experiences and best 
practices that HEIs could be better prepared for security 
incidents. 
    Furthermore, issues of distrust caused by the 
implementation of phishing exercises in HEIs could have 
strained the relationship between academic and IT staff, thus 
making collaboration less likely. It is also likely that the IT 
team and the university have been busy ‘firefighting’ and 
have been overwhelmed by the ‘catch-up game’ with cyber- 
attacks; as a result, they may not have time for engagement 
with users. 
    The impersonal communication from the IT team may be 
something that IT does not have control over. For instance, 
not putting an IT staff member’s name on a service desk 
email could have been a senior management decision to 
increase request response rates. However, interviewees do 
not comment negatively on IT team’s efficiency or 
excellence. 
    In view of our findings, a recommendation would be that 
senior management invest more in training and development 
for IT teams with specific focus on informing, engaging and 
persuading.  
B. Policies and Frameworks for Guiding Cyber Security 
Behaviour   
The lack of enough policies/framework could have been 
caused by lack of clear strategy needed to influence these 
written rules. Also, senior management may not have the 
expertise required to create polices/frameworks. 
Furthermore, other priorities could have taken the place of 
policy creation. The implication of these is that users engage 
in actions, activities, and habits which they perceive to be 
right but that may turn out to be detrimental to the security 
of HEIs assets.  
    Unclear and insufficient policies will lead to limited 
knowledge, understanding and awareness among users, as 
the available policies may not cover some security aspects 
which need protection. This creates some compliance gaps 
as some security expectations will not be known and cannot 
be followed. It then becomes difficult for users to see their 
role as critical in sustaining the security of their university. 
Users’ attitude could also be affected negatively because 
they are not aware of frameworks that could guide them. 
Hence, they may see security as the IT team’s problem and 
may not bother about incident reporting. 
    At times, policy creation responsibility of senior 
management is delegated to other staff members, but there 
is no guarantee that the staff members have the necessary 
skills to execute the duties. The study [41] shows where 
duties intended for senior leaders are delegated, outcomes 
are suboptimal. 
    It is possible that policies are not in place because they 
are not prioritised by senior management. Maybe regulatory 
compliance like GDPR is prioritised over security policies, 
to avoid reputational damage and fines. Prioritisation issues 
in policies could be caused by lack of understanding about 
the risks and threats HEIs face. Also, there is the lack of 
understanding on how to conduct cyber security 
measurement. It then becomes difficult for senior 
management to make decisions about policies, prioritise the 
allocation of significant but limited resources to address 
increasing vulnerabilities and cyber attacks.  
    We observe that HEIs’ cyber security strategy is unclear 
and not fully operational. This means that strategy could not 
influence policies, resulting in a lack of clarity and 
prioritisation in policies. Communicating policies will be 
hindered further because of the problems we identify in the 
key theme, communication.  
    To address the aforementioned problems, a 
recommendation would be that senior management 
prioritise the creation of a cyber security strategy, around 
which security policies could be built. This could be a 
starting point which expands to various cyber security areas. 
HEI leaders should engage academics’ expertise within their 
institutions, to assist in the creation of policies, something 
that we did not observe, and which caused additional 
friction. Policies should specify the expected security 
behaviours of users. There should also be a way testing 
users’ understanding of policies as communication is not 
effective until recipients understand the information being 
conveyed. Additionality, training on using quantitative 
approach for CSC measurement should be provided to the 
relevant HEI teams.   
C. IT Expectations 
IT Expectations Finding 1 indicates that IT expectations 
are not well defined. The possible cause of this could be that 
those responsible for defining IT expectations lacks the 
required understanding. This is similar to the lack of 
understanding of security culture that results in CSC being 
ill-defined [16]. Other possible causes of unclear IT 
expectations could be the lack of cyber security strategy, 
resource limitations, and time pressures on the IT staff. 
    The lack of strategic direction and expectations that users 
see may result in them not having trust in any of the IT 
expectations that they are advised about. The act of senior 
cyber security academics approaching IT teams to offer help 
may indicate that serious problems exit in the IT teams and 
within its processes.  
    Also, there could be a knowledge gap between IT staff 
and academics which might have an influence on the users’ 
attitudes to learning about cyber security. This attitude could 
have resulted in compliance disparity that we observe 
among the user groups. For example, we saw a higher 
security compliance rate among administrative staff, who 
are better informed on security-related processes, in 
comparison to academics.  
    Users indicate they will comply with IT expectations if 
they know what these expectations are. Their willingness to 
comply is a positive attitude towards security. From our 
study, we observe that users, ranging from academics to 
students see the need for compliance and understand its 
benefits. This compliance readiness is what the HEIs could 
work with and use for ‘nudging’ users towards cultivating 
certain security behaviours in the university [42]. Small 
changes could be introduced in the design of solutions, 
where decisions need to be made. For example, nudges 
could be used where a user needs to decide whether or not 
to report a security incident. In this way, the user is 
encouraged to adopt the desired behaviour leading to an 
incident reporting. While a one-size-fits-all nudge approach 
may produce a useful outcome, personalised nudges could 
be more effective, although personalised nudges have been 
seen as threat to user autonomy [43]. 
    However, compliance even when expectations are known 
does not always happen. Our study shows that users will 
resist unrealistic expectations, as common sense implies. It 
is therefore important for IT staff in HEIs to engage and 
communicate with users, particularly where expectations 
could be perceived as borderline/unrealistic. This might 
enhance user understanding and, thus, compliance. 
    Extant literature confirms our finding of distrust, and it 
states that phishing exercises create more problems than 
solve them [36]. The literature points out the reasons why an 
organisation should not phish staff as it creates distress, and 
even distrust between users and security, as some of the 
interviewees in our research explain. 
    Given the aforementioned challenges, we recommend that 
IT expectations are reviewed by a multi-disciplinary team. 
D. Moving Away from Phishing Exercises   
To promote collaboration and engagement between the 
IT team and users, the implementation of phishing exercises 
is to be avoided. HEIs represent freedom of expression and 
openness. Utilising an approach which causes distrust stifles 
relationship-building and collaboration. Using the outcomes 
of phishing exercises to blame users could create an 
environment that is void of transparency and openness. 
There is a tendency that blaming users could stop them from 
reporting security incidents or near misses when they occur. 
Therefore, an opportunity for the IT team to address a 
vulnerability could be left to a cyber attack to exploit. 
    It seems that resistance to phishing exercises come from 
almost all users, except for senior management that might 
have authorised them in the first place. Even if phishing 
exercises were to be used, the time needed to think through, 
and administer non-repetitive innovative exercises by HEIs 
IT teams may not be available.  
    Some academics feel phishing exercise could be used to 
understand the current cyber security state of the university. 
For example, the level of preparedness of users, which 
individual needs to be upskilled. Increasing security 
knowledge in HEIs is seen as important but there is a feeling 
that there is more to security knowledge that sending out 
phishing emails and making personnel attend mandatory 
training. 
    In line with a senior security staff interviewee, we argue 
that the implementation of phishing exercises approach 
should be avoided. We recommend that HEIs senior 
management investigate the problems caused by 
implementing phishing exercises in their HEIs from users’ 
perspective. A clear picture could only be seen if senior 
management examine users’ attitude toward security issues, 
their security behaviours and how critical they now consider 
their responsibilities to be in securing HEIs information 
assets, after they have been phished. This is likely to change 
senior management’s opinion towards implementing 
phishing exercises in their HEIs.  
E. Training, Reinforced Training and Awareness    
The lack of enough cyber security training in HEIs could 
be because of limited financial resources in HEIs [38]. Also, 
prioritisation issues identified in policies and ill-defined IT 
expectations may mean that the most pressing security need 
is not identified and as a result could not be addressed by 
training. For example, our study did not observe social 
engineering training as a matter of priority in HEIs. 
    The implication of insufficient training is that users 
engage in unsafe security behaviours that could compromise 
security. Without adequate training, users are not aware, are 
uninformed, and are not equipped to deal with current 
security issues. This could make HEIs and other users 
susceptible to cyber attacks.  
    We observe that a link exists between training, 
communication, and policies. Training can be used to 
communicate policies to users, thus bringing awareness, 
understanding, and influencing cyber security culture across 
the HEIs. Training approach and training content are also 
important. When training users, storytelling and other 
approaches that have been found to promote engagement 
and knowledge transfer should be considered. 
    As security compliance is influenced by training, it is 
important for cyber security training to be taken seriously by 
HEI senior management. Furthermore, there are cloud 
computing challenges with distant learning following the 
changes introduced by Covid-19 lockdown which affects 
education delivery [44].  
    We recommend that senior management prioritise and 
invest in trainings, including offering training that focuses 
on social engineering and other human aspects of security. 
F. CSC Measurement 
An understanding of how to measure CSC and its 
implementation across institutions is needed. From our 
analysis, we found that people/universities do not know how 
to measure CSC. Also, the scales and the matrices that have 
been promoted by standard bodies such as International 
Organisation for Standardisation (OSI), National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) and Open Web 
Application Security Project (OWASP), does not consider 
the complexity of cyber security, changing technology and 
human agents [3]. Hubbard and Seiersen [3] argue that 
compliance with standards and regulations does not improve 
cyber security risk management and the metrics for 
assessing the risks are flawed.  
    If the approach of assessing cyber threats and measuring 
security risk and culture is flawed or not known, then the 
true state of security in HEIs may not be determined. This 
makes informed decisions about resource allocation and 
other security investments a challenge for HEI senior 
management. Without the ability for assessing the current 
state of security through training uptake, incident reporting 
and behaviour change, we cannot demonstrate that progress 
has been made in terms of CSC in HEIs.  
    We recommend that HEIs consider ways of conducting 
CSC measurement.  
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Communication is the central theme that must be fully 
embraced and continuously utilised if CSC is to be 
developed in HEIs. Communication with its approaches is 
significant because without it, all the other themes that we 
identify in this study will not be impactful in HEIs. Thus, 
we establish that communication is interwoven with the 
themes – policies and frameworks, IT expectations, moving 
away from phishing exercise, training, reinforced training 
and awareness, and CSC measurement. These themes are 
the factors that influences personnel and students’ view of 
CSC in HEIs.  
    Currently, the approach of communication in the HEIs we 
examined needs to change. This includes communication 
between the IT team and users, as well communication from 
senior management to HEI staff. While there is information 
flow from the IT teams to users, we observe that dialogue is 
lacking. Hence, a new approach is needed that promotes 
engagement and collaboration. 
    Training, reinforced training and awareness are necessary 
to ensure that security information communicated through 
policies, frameworks and programmes are always at the 
fingertips and on the minds of users. Hence, training and 
awareness require an effective communication strategy so 
that its delivery could make maximum impact and change 
people’s mindsets towards cyber security. In view of this, 
no-one should be exempted from training, irrespective of 
their status or hierarchy within the institutions. 
    There must be a conscious effort and drive from senior 
management team to create multi-disciplinary team of 
experts who will champion the promotion of CSC in HEIs 
and challenge the reactive attitude of “always being in the 
catch-up game with cyber attacks”. The multi-disciplinary 
team could also be involved in co-creating policies by 
involving other users and fostering engagement. This 
approach will be a useful one for replacing phishing 
exercises which we have proved to be problematic, 
ineffective and have also been strongly opposed by 
academics, students, and other users. 
    The expertise of academics in HEIs have not been fully 
utilised in the quest to defend the institutions from cyber 
attacks. We recommend that senior management members 
kick-start an initiative to engage academics and seek ways 
of using their expertise, experience, and their innovative 
approach for defending the information assets of the HEIs. 
Any solutions that come out of the initiative could be 
integrated into the university training and awareness 
programmes and could also be shared with other sectors.  
    In sum, the implementation of a communication strategy, 
engagement and collaborative effort will be valuable in 
developing a cyber security culture and by so doing securing 
information assets of HEIs and reducing security breaches 
caused by human error.  
    There are a few limitations of the study. As in all 
qualitative analysis, researchers bias could be a concern. To 
avoid self-reporting bias [45] and maximise the value of our 
approach, leading questions were avoided. We used open-
ended questions, allowing the interviewees to give detailed 
answers, using their own words. Further, more personnel 
could have been interviewed in our study. The barrier to 
this, was the Covid-19 lockdown which affected the 
response we received from the HEI personnel we contacted. 
    Our research shows that there is limited or no 
measurement of CSC in the HEIs that we examined. Hence, 
future research could investigate how CSC could be 
measured in different HEIs. Also, research can explore how 
cyber security training needs of different users in various 
departments could be identified. Appropriate training can 
then be geared towards an individual user instead of 
applying a one-size-fits-all approach. Another aspect that 
could be researched is HEIs’ response to embracing 
technological change following the disruption introduced by 
the Covid-19 pandemic. 
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